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Abstract—Modern vehicles rely on scores of electronic control
units (ECUs) broadcasting messages over a few controller area
networks (CANs). Bereft of security features, in-vehicle CANs
are exposed to cyber manipulation and multiple researches have
proved viable, life-threatening cyber attacks. Complicating the
issue, CAN messages lack a common mapping of functions to
commands, so packets are observable but not easily decipherable.
We present a transformational approach to CAN IDS that
exploits the geometric properties of CAN data to inform two
novel detectors—one based on distance from a learned, lower
dimensional manifold and the other on discontinuities of the
manifold over time. Proof-of-concept tests are presented by
implementing a potential attack approach on a driving vehicle.
The initial results suggest that (1) the first detector requires
additional refinement but does hold promise; (2) the second
detector gives a clear, strong indicator of the attack; and (3)
the algorithms keep pace with high-speed CAN messages. As
our approach is data-driven it provides a vehicle-agnostic IDS
that eliminates the need to reverse engineer CAN messages and
can be ported to an after-market plugin.
I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
Modern vehicles rely on scores of embedded computers
called electronic control units (ECUs) that control and facili-
tate communication of sub-systems by broadcasting messages
over a few controller area network (CAN) buses. Since ECUs
control most vehicle functions, adversarial manipulation of
CAN signals have potentially severe consequences. CAN
protocol is bereft of basic security features, e.g., encryption
and authentication, and therefore vehicle CANs are exposed
to exploitation. The now-mandatory OBD-II port gives direct
access to CANs. In addition the proliferation of vehicle
interfaces, e.g., V2X, cellular, and WiFi, increases the attack
surface. Multiple researchers have demonstrated remote access
to CANs [1–3] causing life-threatening manipulations, most
notably, the remote Jeep hack of Miller & Valasek [2].
Consequently, recent research has focused on identify-
ing CAN vulnerabilities and providing defensive capabilities.
Many previous works have proposed changing CAN standards
to incorporate security, e.g., [4–6], but most are unadopted as
they require costly evolution of standards and hardware. A
notable exception, Brown et al. [7], proposed message control
firmware implemented in each ECU, a solution presumably
cheap to retrofit. We pursue after-market, vehicle-agnostic
security solutions that do not require hardware changes.
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Developing vehicle-agnostic solutions is especially chal-
lenging for passenger vehicles because there is no publicly
available translation from in-vehicle network data to vehicle
functions. Further, CAN-to-function mappings vary per model.
In short, even though packets are observable, there is no
existing way to automatically know what mechanisms they
control. This is a primary roadblock to defending CANs and
calls for data analytics approaches to pioneer vehicle-agnostic
detection and prevention capabilities [8–11].
A. Related CAN IDS Work
Of the research to build intrusion detection systems (IDSs)
for the currently-adopted CAN systems, there is a natural
trichotomy:
1) Rule-based IDS: Early works involve rule-based detectors,
an analogue of signature-based detection in enterprise
security. These can detect simple signal-injection attacks,
(sophisticated but very limited) bus-off attacks (see Cho et
al. [12]), and potentially ECU reprogramming [13–15].
2) Frequency-based IDS: Important CAN messages are sent
redundantly with fixed frequency. The next trend in the
CAN IDS research literature is to exploit the regular fre-
quency of important CAN messages. Frequency anomalies
have been explored to detect and prevent signal-injection
attacks and potentially ECU reprogramming [9, 16, 17].
3) ECU-fingerprinting IDS: After publication of the Jeep
hack [2], in which some ECUs were silenced and others
controlled to send spoofed messages in lieu of the silenced
ECUs, CAN IDS research transitioned to more sophisti-
cated methods all focused on automatic ECU identification
as a stepping stone to IDS. (No sender/receiver information
is included in CAN packets). These detectors use data-
driven techniques to classify which ECU sent each message
by exploiting timing or voltage signatures [18–20]. These
can detect signals that originate from the wrong transmitter.
Miller & Valasek [2, 11] exhibited the capability to com-
promise and control an ECU. It follows that Stuxnet-style
attacks (see [21]) on the CANs are possible and the logical
next step for sophisticated adversaries. Specifically, ECU-
authentic attacks, in which manipulated messages are sent
from the expected ECU at the expected time, are possible.
Such capabilities are exhibited by after-market “chipping”,
performance-tuning kits that reprogram ECUs. Albeit currently
unseen, such attacks are not detectable by any above IDS,
although possibly by one IDS that does not fit into the above
trichotomy; Ganesan et al. [22] use pairwise correlation of
fixed values (e.g., speed, pedal angle) from CAN data and extra
sensors to encode simple relationships and detect injection
attacks. We build on this idea—using more sophisticated
techniques to model subtle, nonlinear relationships in CAN
data without needing to know it’s functional meaning—with
the goal of eventually proving these hypothetical attacks will
be accurately detected.
B. Novel Approach & Contributions
To identify currently undetectable CAN manipulations, we
present a transformational approach to CAN IDS. Our ap-
proach uses data-driven techniques to first learn, then exploit
the shape—geometric and topological properties—of the CAN
data to identify attacks. A vehicle’s signals share necessary
correlations because they communicate properties of a physical
system. For a simple example, speedometer angle is highly
correlated with the wheels’ speed, but negatively correlated
with braking. As modern vehicles comprise many complex,
interacting systems, we expect more subtle and complicated
relationships. Our hypotheses are that the naturally high-
dimensional, time-varying CAN data will lie on a learnable,
low dimensional manifold; the data will move continuously on
this manifold over time; and even ECU-authentic, coordinated
manipulations to CAN signals will cause detectable anomalies
to these characterizations:
1) Distance fromManifold Anomaly: Uncoordinated attacks
(where malicious messages are not in concert with the car’s
other messages, such as the famous Jeep hack [2]) will
produce data that leaves the manifold.
2) Time Increment Discontinuity: Coordinated attacks
(where all interdependent signals are spoofed to a valid,
but manipulated configuration, as in a replay attack) and
uncoordinated attacks will cause a discontinuity on the
manifold if they change the vehicle’s state drastically.
In this paper we introduce our novel, non-linear, shape-
based anomaly detection algorithms, provide visualizations
of the time-varying CAN data manifold, and present ini-
tial results seeking proof-of-concept of this anomaly IDS
by implementing a potential attack approach on a driving
vehicle. Our algorithmic developments regard performance
and are sufficiently advanced to admit online detection of
messages on the high-speed CAN. Overall, this paper gives a
transformational approach to CAN detection that has two main
advantages: 1) it promises to detect ECU-authentic attacks that
no published IDS method has demonstrated; 2) as the approach
is completely data-driven, it provides an after-market, vehicle-
agnostic, and online IDS.
C. CAN Message Basics
CAN is a broadcast protocol with 0 the dominant bit,
meaning if multiple ECUs send opposing bits, the 0 overwrites
the 1. All ECUs can emit bits until the end of the arbitration
ID (AID) portion of the frame, whence the lone ECU with the
lowest AID has the floor. (Each AID is assigned to a single
ECU.) Refer to Fig 1. The up-to eight byte data portion is the
message contents, and injecting a signal requires only manip-
ulating or injecting appropriate AID and data combinations to
elicit the desired vehicle response. Most AIDs are sent with
fixed frequency and redundant data.
Fig. 1: Image from Cho & Shin [18] of CAN 2.0 data frame. 11 bit arbitration
ID field used for prioritization of messages. Up-to eight byte data field used
for message contents.
We follow a key discovery of Moore et al. [10]—for
most signals the correct unit of analysis of CAN data are
consecutive byte pairs of a data frame. Each up-to eight-byte
data frame padding with 0s if under eight bytes, decomposed
into four separate two-byte messages with integer values in
[0, 22∗8 − 1]. I.e., most processes of a vehicle are indexed by
the (AID, byte pair) combination; e.g., we have observed a
single AID where the first byte pair encoded headlights while
the last byte pair encoded speedometer values. We confirmed
this claim both empirically and via consultation with a CAN
engineer. Any CAN signals not following this convention will
not be correctly encoded by our method. The mapping of byte
pairs to function is non-public and varies per model; hence,
our approach is data-driven.
II. METHODOLOGY
A priori, CAN traffic is high dimensional—vehicles
often exhibit over 100 AIDs (over 400 byte
pairs or PIDs), and each taking potentially
Fig. 2: Forward (top) & Reverse (bottom)
speed profiles for ambient data capture
depicted.
216 = 65, 536 values.
However, our understand-
ing of the physical world
suggests that there are far
fewer actual degrees of
freedom present in the
data. This section presents
a methodology to learn a
more fitting, lower dimen-
sional representation.
As our application is
anomaly detection, we re-
quire an ambient data
capture for model fitting.
Expecting different vehi-
cle states to admit differ-
ent inter-dependencies in
the data, we train mod-
els on data captured while
(attempting to accurately)
drive the vehicle in forward/reverse through the top/bottom
speed profile in Fig. 2, respectively. Hence, the states we
consider are Key On (on and in park), Accelerating, Speed
(holding constant speed), Braking, and Reverse.
For pre-processing, we discard any byte pairs for which only
a single value is observed in all ambient data, leaving ≈ 70
byte pairs. While our goal is initial implementation and proof
of concept, actual use of our IDS will likely require greater
variety in ambient data to minimize unseen signals. Each byte
pair’s values are regarded as a numerical time series.
A. Correlation Spectral Co-Clustering
We apply spectral co-clustering of Dhillon [23], which treats
a given data matrix as an adjacency matrix of a bipartite
graph (with nodes for each row on one side, and nodes for
each column on the other) and uses normalized cuts (see
Shi & Malik [24]) to find clusters. The upshot is both the
rows and columns can be grouped simultaneously. For our
application, we interpolate each series to a fixed length and
generate the pair-wise correlation matrix. Equipped with this
correlation matrix, we use spectral co-clustering implemented
in Scikit [25] to group byte pairs via correlation. In our
application to the byte pair correlation matrix, each byte pair
appears as a node on each side of the bipartite graph with
edges weighted by the correlation of byte pair pairs.
Fig. 3: Correlation heatmap after rearranging
byte pairs to group co-clusters.
In order to label the
clusters we include a
synthetic “canonical
byte pair” for each
state. E.g., for the
“Speed” state we take
the time series of speed
measurements during
the data capture (see
Moore et al. [10]),
using a cubic spline,
interpolate to the
required byte pair
length, and cluster
along with the actual
byte pairs.
See Fig. 3 produced by rearranging rows/columns to group
clusters and apply vehicle state labels. The large darker regions
along the diagonal represent groups of byte pairs with similar
correlation structure. The clusters are labeled according to
which cluster the above “cannonical processes” belong. The
main take-away is two-fold: (1) byte pairs comprising a cluster
share a similar correlation structure across vehicle states; (2)
There exists a mapping between clusters generated in this way
and characteristics of the underlying physical system.
B. Learning a time-varying lower dimensional manifold
Since clustered byte pairs vary together, we seek a low
dimensional manifold for each cluster. This makes intuitive
sense as we do not expect those byte pairs galvanized by
accelerating to vary smoothly with those byte pairs stimulated
upon braking and so on. For the sake of succinctness, we
proceed only with the manifold for the “Speed” cluster. Let
p1, ..., pn denote the byte pairs of our cluster, and x(t) :=
[p1(t), ..., pn(t)]
T , the vector of byte pair values at time t.
We use Diffusion Maps of Coifman & Lafon [26] to obtain
a low dimensional representation for each time t as follows:1
1See De la Porte et al.’s treatment [27] for an intuitive explanation.
1) Markov Marix Let P be the matrix so that P (i, j),
interpreted as the probability of jumping from xi to xj , is
proportional to K(xi, xj) = exp(−γ‖xi−xj‖
2). Here ‖.‖
denotes Euclidean distance, and γ a bandwidth parameter.2
2) Diffusion Space Map each xi 7→ yi := [P
k(xi∗)]
T , the ith
column of P k. Note that P k is the matrix of probabilities
after k hops, and
∑
u(‖P
k(xi, u)−P
k(u, xj)‖
2) = ‖yi−
yj‖
2 is small for large k iff xi and xj are close on the
dataset’s intrinsic geometry.
3) Projection It follows that a lower dimensional representa-
tion respecting the data’s shape is given by projecting to
m << n principle components of P k for large k (equiva-
lently of P , eliminating need for parameter k), where m is
chosen by the user. Explicitly, if ξi are the n eigenvectors
of P ordered by largest to smallest eigenvalues, then our
projection is xi 7→ Ψ(xi) :=
∑m+1
i=2 〈yi, ξi〉ξi. The first
eigenvector is omitted as it is constant when P = PT .
Each color in Fig. 4 is the manifold obtained from the “Speed”
cluster for a single time t.
Fig. 4: Embedding of the “Speed” manifold into m = 3 dimensions. Colors
yellow to green to blue indicate progression of the manifold over time.
Naively, to embed a previously unseen point (e.g., x(t+1)),
it is necessary to recalculate the Markov matrix and solve
the eigenvector problem over again. While this poses no
theoretical problems, the matrix for to the “Speed” cluster is on
the order of 105×105, so recalculating the matrix at each time
step to embed new points is infeasible for an online procedure.
Leveraging our hypothesis, that the rank of the matrix is much
lower than its size, we use the Nystro¨m method [28, 29].
Concisely, we sub-sample xˆ1, . . . , xˆk for k = 1000 <<
105 ≈ n observed points, {xi}
n
i=1, and use the principle com-
ponents of Nystro¨m approximated Pˆ (an n×n approximation
of P with rank at most k).3 We choose k = 1000 because
at k = 1000 we can embed points fast enough to keep up
with the speed of the CAN messages, and it seems likely
2 Choosing γ very small/large causes all points in the resulting embedding
to be near/far from each other in the diffusion space. An effective heuristic
we employed for choosing γ is to plot log
∑
P against log γ and choose γ
corresponding to the extent of the linear region.
3 We define Pˆ from Kˆ := ABAT , an approximation of K , where A =
(K(xi, xˆj))n×k and B the psuedo-inverse of K(xˆi, xˆj)k×k .
that the dimension of the physical system determining the
dependencies of the “Speed” cluster is far less than 1000.
This permits calculation of the manifold incrementally at
CAN message pace. Time is depicted in Fig. 4 by the
progression from warm to cool colors. Note that the manifold
evolves rather continuously.
C. Detectors
Our method gives rise to two methods of anomaly detection.
1) Distance to Manifold Anomaly: Given a previously un-
seen observation x and S the ambient dataset, if ‖Ψ(x)−
Ψ(S)|| > KDist we flag on xt. Here Ψ
(k)(S) denotes the
embedding image of the ambient training set and KDist a
threshold. Intuitively, this schema reflects the idea that if
we have a sufficient training set then normal observations
should be mapped onto the manifold given by Ψ(S).
Conversely, if a signal is manipulated its discordance with
the normal data should produce a jump from the manifold.
2) Time Increment Discontinuity: The second schema in-
volves continuity on the manifold. Let x(ti), x(ti+1)
denote subsequent observations. We flag if ||Ψ(x(ti)) −
Ψ(x(ti+1))|| > KCont. Intuitively, this schema reflects the
idea that if an attacker can manipulate all correlated PIDs in
concert (as in a replay attack), they will be detected, unless
they change the data in a fashion such that the resulting
rate of change reflects that of the ambient dataset.
III. EXPERIMENT
Here we present the initial test of our detectors. To imple-
ment a potential attack approach, we identified a collection of
byte pairs that share high correlations to the vehicle speed (and
therefore to each other). Using the OBD-II port, we injected
at high frequency each of these byte pairs with a perturbation
of its expected value while driving (on a dynamometer) at
constant speed. If the perturbation is sufficiently large, this
attack can disable a vehicle causing it to coast to a stop. Here
we perturbed the values enough to cause the vehicle systems
to malfunction but not shut down. The attack data capture is
hosted over a period of 70s. Malicious traffic is injected in
three 10s intervals, roughly [10, 20], [30, 40], [50, 60].
Fig. 5 presents the two detection distances for the at-
tack capture. The first shows the distance from the “Speed”
manifold of the CAN traffic over time. The seconds shows
the distance between two consecutive points on the ”Speed”
manifold over time (referred to along the y-axis as increment
distance). Both statistics were generated in an online fashion
at faster or equal to the speed of CAN traffic.
The first figure exhibits unexpected behavior. While there
is a clear signal during the attack period, the distance to
the ambient manifold is often lower during attack intervals
than otherwise. We conjecture that the ambient dataset is not
sufficiently representative of the testing data capture.
The second figure, depicting increment distance, provides a
clear signal of the attack, admitting accurate detection for a
wide range of thresholds. In the event of a more sophisticated
Fig. 5: Distance from ambient manifold (top) and increment distance (bottom)
depicted for data with malicious values injected at high frequency for one byte
pair during times [10, 20], [20, 30], [30, 40] seconds.
attack where ECU-authentic messages are sent with manip-
ulated values, our evidence is that the oscillations seen here
would not be present, and instead the figure would show six
outlying plateaus each denoting the start or stop of an attack
interval, respectively. Because this is an online procedure
and messages on the CAN bus come milliseconds apart,
this detection schema can identify an attack and alert almost
instantly. Both figures, particularly the second, suggest that
the general shape-based approach does capture the information
needed to for separating ambient and anomalous CAN traffic
in a completely car agnostic fashion, but more refining and
testing is needed.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces an online, manifold learning tech-
nique to produce two novel anomaly detectors that seek
to exploit unexpected changes in the geometric properties
of CAN data for detection. From an ambient capture of
CAN data, spectral co-clustering is used to group CAN data
according to correlated signals during each vehicle driving
state. Next, diffusion mappings are used to produce a low
dimensional representation of the data for each state, and an
update formula allows the manifolds to evolve over time. We
discovered that this representation evolves continuously, and
leverage this fact for detection. Our work informs two novel
detectors: one based on distance from the expected manifold,
learned in a training period on ambient data; the second based
on increment distance in the lower dimensional space over
time. Further the algorithm is crafted with sufficient treatment
of computational complexity to permit real-time application.
Targeting passenger vehicles, in which no publicly available
mapping of the CAN signals to vehicle functions is present,
our method is data driven, to facilitate after-market use upon
sufficient refinement.
Seeking proof of concept, we implement a potential attack
scenario on a driving vehicle, and test the detectors. In terms of
accuracy, our results suggest that the first detector is currently
insufficient and more representative training data is likely
necessary. The second detector gives a strong indication of
the attacks, working as expected. We note that this detector
promises to identify ECU-authenticated attacks—where sig-
nals are sent from the expected ECU at the expected time, but
with manipulated data. Performance-wise, the algorithm keeps
pace with CAN data, meaning real-time detection is possible.
Further testing and refinement is needed. A deeper look
at the manifold distance detector, in particular, investigations
into what constitutes a sufficient training data set is necessary.
For the increment distance, the results are overwhelmingly
positive. Testing on more diverse and sophisticated attacks
is needed, as well as on multiple diverse vehicles. For both
detectors a method for setting the threshold is required.
Overall, the paper introduces and provides proof-of-concept
of a novel, computationally viable CAN IDS that holds the
promise of detecting next generation CAN attacks.
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